Twice, in 2025 and 2026, the D.C. Circuit used mandamus to stop a district court's criminal-contempt inquiry into the March 2025 removal flights. What the decisions say about the writ's reach.

Criminal contempt is the judiciary's means of enforcing its own orders. Mandamus is the means by which an appellate court confines a lower court to the lawful exercise of its authority. In the litigation arising from the March 2025 removal flights under the Alien Enemies Act, the two collided. This article sets out what happened and what the decisions mean for the use of the writ, without taking a position on the underlying dispute.

Background

On March 15, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia entered a temporary restraining order in J.G.G. v. Trump, No. 25-cv-766, concerning removals under the Alien Enemies Act. Removal flights to El Salvador proceeded that day. On April 7, 2025, the Supreme Court vacated the restraining orders in Trump v. J.G.G., holding that challenges of that kind must be brought in habeas in the district of confinement. In April 2025, the district court found probable cause to believe that the government had committed criminal contempt by not complying with the restraining order, and began proceedings to identify the responsible officials.

The first writ

The government sought review by appeal and mandamus. On August 8, 2025, a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit granted mandamus and vacated the probable-cause order. The two judges in the majority wrote separately and did not agree on a single rationale; the third judge dissented. On November 14, 2025, the full court denied rehearing en banc, with statements by several judges. Some of those statements indicated that the district court could still pursue its inquiry consistently with the panel's ruling, and the district court resumed proceedings.

The second writ

The government petitioned again. In In re Trump, No. 25-5452 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 14, 2026), a different panel granted the petition, vacated the district court's December 8, 2025 order, and directed it to terminate the criminal-contempt proceedings. The majority opinion reasoned that criminal contempt lies only for violation of an order that is clear and specific, and concluded that the restraining order did not clearly prohibit the transfer of custody on which the contempt inquiry rested, so that continuing the inquiry was an abuse of discretion warranting the writ. A concurring opinion added further reasons. A lengthy dissent disagreed with both the reading of the order and the use of mandamus to end the proceeding.

What the decisions say about the writ

  • The standard is the ordinary one. Both panels applied the three conditions from Cheney: a clear and indisputable right, no other adequate means of relief, and appropriateness in the circumstances.
  • Clarity of the underlying order matters twice. Criminal contempt requires a clear and specific order. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42 and 18 U.S.C. § 401, courts have power to punish disobedience of their lawful orders, and ambiguity is resolved in favour of the person charged. The 2026 majority treated the absence of clarity as the "clear and indisputable" right that mandamus requires.
  • Interlocutory review of contempt is unusual. Criminal contempt is ordinarily reviewed after a conviction. Using mandamus at the probable-cause or investigative stage is the exceptional step the dissenting judges objected to, and it is the feature that makes the decisions significant beyond their facts.

Where things stand

The April 14, 2026 order provided that the administrative stay would dissolve, and the order would become effective, 21 days after issuance, citing D.C. Circuit Rule 41(a)(3). Readers should check the docket for any later proceedings, including any further request for rehearing. For the broader framework, see Mandamus to Disqualify a Judge, FRAP 21 and Can Mandamus Be Issued Against the President?. Immigration rulings of the period are tracked in Mandamus Case Law Updates.

Key points

  • After the March 15, 2025 restraining order and the removal flights, the district court found probable cause of criminal contempt in April 2025.
  • On August 8, 2025, a divided D.C. Circuit panel granted mandamus and vacated the probable-cause order; rehearing en banc was denied on November 14, 2025.
  • In re Trump (D.C. Cir. Apr. 14, 2026) granted a second writ and directed the district court to terminate the contempt proceedings.
  • The majority treated the lack of a clear and specific prohibition in the underlying order as the clear right that mandamus requires.
  • Mandamus at the investigative stage of criminal contempt is exceptional and was contested by dissenting judges.

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Governing authority

  • 18 U.S.C. § 401 — power of courts to punish contempt
  • Fed. R. Crim. P. 42 — criminal contempt procedure
  • Trump v. J.G.G., No. 24A931 (U.S. Apr. 7, 2025) — AEA challenges brought in habeas
  • Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004) — conditions for mandamus
  • Fed. R. App. P. 21 — petitions for writs of mandamus
Educational information only. This article explains general legal principles for research purposes and does not constitute legal advice. Mandamus procedure and standards vary by jurisdiction and change over time. If you have an active legal matter, consult a licensed attorney in your state or the relevant federal circuit.