The Supreme Court held that the TPS statute bars every non-constitutional challenge to a country's TPS termination, including claims about how the decision was made.
On June 25, 2026, the Supreme Court decided Mullin v. Doe, Nos. 25-1083 and 25-1084, consolidated with Trump v. Miot. By a vote of six to three, it held that the Temporary Protected Status statute bars judicial review of all non-constitutional claims challenging the termination of a country's TPS designation, and it reversed lower-court orders that had blocked the terminations for Haiti and Syria. The case is about TPS, but its reading of a review-bar statute matters to anyone who litigates against agencies.
The statute
8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) provides that there is no judicial review of "any determination" of the Secretary of Homeland Security "with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state". The challengers argued that the bar covers only the substance of the Secretary's decision, so that claims about the procedure followed, for example a failure to consult appropriate agencies about country conditions before terminating, remain reviewable under the APA.
The holding
Justice Alito, writing for the Court, read the statutory language as clear and very broad. A claim that the Secretary did not follow the required steps before terminating is a challenge to a determination with respect to the termination, and the bar applies to it. Allowing litigants to recast a challenge to an unreviewable decision as a challenge to how it was made would, in the majority's view, empty the bar of meaning. The Court separately held that the Haitian plaintiffs' equal protection claim was unlikely to succeed. Justice Thomas, concurring, would have held that the bar reaches constitutional claims as well. The dissent argued that the Court's reading leaves the Secretary's compliance with the statute effectively unreviewable.
What the decision means for review-bar arguments
Review bars are among the government's standard defenses in immigration litigation, and they are worded differently. The words decide the outcome. The TPS bar speaks of "any determination ... with respect to" a designation. The general discretionary-decision bar in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) speaks of a "decision or action" whose authority is specified to be discretionary, discussed in Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) After Bouarfa. The adjustment bar in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) covers "any judgment regarding the granting of relief". Mullin confirms that the Court will give broad wording its full breadth, and that a procedural framing does not escape a bar that reaches "any determination".
The decision does not hold that a failure to act is a "determination". A claim that an agency has not decided an individual application at all is different from a challenge to a decision it has made. The TPS bar is also directed at determinations about countries, not at the adjudication of an individual person's application. Arguments about why review bars generally do not reach delay are collected in INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) and Delay.
Where it sits in the case law
Mullin belongs with Patel v. Garland (2022) and Bouarfa v. Mayorkas (2024) as decisions that read immigration review bars according to their text, without a thumb on the scale for review. It contrasts with the TRAC line, which presupposes jurisdiction and asks only whether delay is unreasonable. Readers following later applications of the decision can consult Mandamus Case Law Updates.
Key points
- Mullin v. Doe (June 25, 2026), 6–3, held that 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) bars all non-constitutional challenges to TPS terminations.
- Claims about the procedure followed before terminating are covered; recasting a challenge as procedural does not escape the bar.
- The Haitian plaintiffs' equal protection claim was held unlikely to succeed; Justice Thomas would have barred constitutional claims too.
- The decision reads review bars by their words; it does not hold that a failure to act is a "determination".
- The TPS bar concerns determinations about countries, not individual applications.
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