Many mandamus cases end not with a contested ruling, but with a negotiated resolution or voluntary dismissal.

Because the government frequently adjudicates the underlying matter shortly after being served with a mandamus petition, a significant share of these cases end through settlement or voluntary dismissal rather than a contested judicial decision.

Voluntary dismissal after adjudication

If the respondent completes the requested action — issuing a decision, filing a document, releasing records — the petitioner typically files a notice or stipulation of voluntary dismissal under the applicable civil procedure rules, formally closing the case.

Negotiated settlement agreements

In some cases, the parties negotiate a settlement establishing a specific deadline for the respondent to act, sometimes with additional terms addressing costs or attorney's fees, which the court may then approve or simply allow the parties to file as a basis for dismissal.

Attorney's fees in a voluntary dismissal

Petitioners represented by counsel should address attorney's fees explicitly before dismissing a case, since dismissal can affect eligibility to later seek fees under fee-shifting statutes like the Equal Access to Justice Act — this is a detail worth confirming with counsel before finalizing any dismissal.

Dismissal without prejudice versus with prejudice

A dismissal without prejudice generally preserves the ability to refile later if circumstances warrant, while a dismissal with prejudice typically forecloses that option — petitioners should understand which type of dismissal they are agreeing to before signing any stipulation.

When the case doesn't fully resolve through dismissal

If only part of the requested relief has been achieved — for example, one linked application was adjudicated but another remains pending — petitioners can sometimes narrow the case to the remaining live issues rather than dismissing entirely.

Rule 41(a): notice, stipulation, or court order

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) offers three exits, and only the first is unilateral.

  1. Notice of dismissal, Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Filed by the plaintiff alone, before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment. The trigger is worth reading closely: a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) is neither of those documents, so in a mandamus case where the government has moved to dismiss rather than answered, the unilateral notice is usually still available.
  2. Stipulation, Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Signed by all parties who have appeared; the ordinary route once the government has answered.
  3. Court order, Rule 41(a)(2). Available at any point, on terms the court considers proper, which is how conditions such as a fee waiver or a fixed adjudication date get written into the exit.

Rule 41(a)(1)(B) supplies the default effect: unless the notice or stipulation states otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice. It also contains the trap. If the plaintiff has previously dismissed any federal- or state-court action based on or including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits. A second voluntary dismissal of a recurring delay claim can therefore end it permanently.

Keeping the court able to enforce the deal

An agreement that the agency will decide by a date is worth what a court can do about it, and after dismissal that is usually nothing by default. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994), holds that enforcing a settlement is a separate contract claim requiring its own basis of federal jurisdiction, unless the dismissal order either incorporates the settlement terms or expressly retains jurisdiction over the agreement.

That converts a drafting point into a practical one. A bare stipulation under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) that recites nothing leaves a plaintiff with a promise and no forum. A dismissal entered under Rule 41(a)(2) that states the terms, or that expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce them, keeps the judge available if the deadline passes.

The distinction matters most where the agreed step is scheduling rather than deciding — an interview date, a records transfer, a queue position — because those commitments are the ones most likely to slip.

What the dismissal leaves unresolved

A case that ends this way ends without a ruling. No court has held that the duty existed, that the delay was unreasonable, or that the agency was wrong, so nothing about the dismissal protects against the same delay recurring; a fresh problem needs a fresh action, subject to the two-dismissal rule in Rule 41(a)(1)(B).

Fees are the other loose end. The Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), directs an award to a prevailing party other than the United States unless the court finds the government's position substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust; § 2412(d)(1)(B) requires the application within 30 days of final judgment; and § 2412(d)(2)(A) caps attorney fees at $125 per hour unless a cost-of-living increase or a special factor justifies more. The obstacle is the word prevailing. Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), rejected the catalyst theory — that a party prevails by prompting the outcome it wanted — and courts have carried that reasoning into fee litigation generally. An agency that acts and a case that is then dismissed frequently leave no prevailing party at all.

Key points

  • A Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss is neither an answer nor a summary-judgment motion, so the unilateral notice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) usually remains available.
  • Rule 41(a)(1)(B) turns a second notice of dismissal of the same claim into an adjudication on the merits.
  • Under Kokkonen, a court loses power to enforce a settlement unless the dismissal order incorporates the terms or expressly retains jurisdiction.
  • An EAJA application must be filed within 30 days of final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), and the statutory rate cap is subject to cost-of-living adjustment.
  • Buckhannon's rejection of the catalyst theory is why a plaintiff whose case becomes moot after the agency acts often recovers nothing.

Procedural authority

  • 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) — the Equal Access to Justice Act: fees for a prevailing party where the government's position was not substantially justified
  • Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)
  • Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)
  • Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994)
  • Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001)
Educational information only. This article explains general legal principles for research purposes and does not constitute legal advice. Mandamus procedure and standards vary by jurisdiction and change over time. If you have an active legal matter, consult a licensed attorney in your state or the relevant federal circuit.